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Tackling Europe’s undeclared economy 
 
by Colin C. Williams 
 
 
Across the European Union, many businesses and individuals hide some or all of their monetary 
transactions from the public authorities either for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes. 
Although they may personally benefit from doing so, there are also significant wider costs. This 
undeclared economy creates risks for the health and safety of workers and damages working 
conditions, hinders job creation, puts at greater risk the financial stability of social protection 
systems and causes unfair competition for legitimate business (Williams, 2014). 
 
How big is the undeclared economy?  
Estimating the size of the undeclared economy is difficult because it is by definition hidden from 
view. The most widely-used measurement method – the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators 
multiple-causes) technique (Schneider, 2005) - estimates the size of the undeclared economy in the 
European Union (EU) to be 18.4 per cent of GDP, ranging from 7.6 per cent in Austria to 31.9 per 
cent in Bulgaria, with a clear East-West and North-South divide (see Figure 1). No Western and 
Northern European countries have undeclared economies larger than the EU average and most East-
Central and Southern European nations have above average undeclared economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: derived from Schneider (2013) 
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Figure 1: Size of undeclared economy as % of GDP, 2012: by country
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If all of this undeclared work was declared, European public expenditure could increase by around 
one-fifth, and healthcare expenditure for example could be doubled (Murphy, 2012).  
 
What types of undeclared work exist? 
For a long time, the undeclared economy was viewed as composed of low-paid waged work 
conducted under ‘sweatshop’ conditions. However, there is a continuum of wage levels in the 
undeclared economy, just as in the declared economy. Although the mean wage is lower than in the 
declared economy, there is overlap with some undeclared waged work higher paid than declared 
employment (Krstić and Sanfey, 2011). There is also recognition that some declared employees 
sometimes receive two wages from their formal employer; an official declared salary and an additional 
undeclared (‘envelope’) wage.  
However, much undeclared work is self-employment. At one end are profit-motivated varieties. 
These range from ‘bogus self-employment’, where a person works for one employer but is self-
employed and pays no wage tax and has no rights (e.g., dismissal protection, vacation entitlements), 
through to various forms of ‘real’ self-employment. This ranges from registered traders undertaking 
some of their transactions off-the-books, to unregistered enterprises trading wholly off-the-books. One 
outcome has been a re-reading of the undeclared economy as a ‘hidden enterprise culture’. Indeed, in 
both OECD nations and developing countries, two-thirds of all businesses start-up unregistered in the 
informal economy (Autio and Fu, 2015).   
Yet other undeclared self-employment is more community-oriented rather than market-like, ranging 
from for-profit entrepreneurs conducting jobs for social rationales (e.g., when an elderly person is 
charged less than the market rate) to paid favours conducted for, and by, close social relations to help 
each other out (e.g., paying an unemployed family member to do your decorating so as to give them 
money, which they would not otherwise accept because they would see it as charity).  
 
How can the undeclared economy be tackled? 
There are four hypothetical policy options: do nothing; move declared work into the undeclared 
economy; eradicate the undeclared economy, or transfer undeclared work into the declared 
economy. Doing nothing is unacceptable; it leaves intact the negative impacts on formal businesses, 
undeclared enterprises and workers, customers and governments discussed at the outset. De-
regulating the declared economy is also a non-starter because it results in a levelling down of 
working conditions. Eradicating undeclared work is unworkable because it would with one hand 
squash precisely the active citizenship and entrepreneurship that with other hands governments 
want to foster. Moving undeclared work into the declared economy thus appears the most viable 
policy option. How, therefore, can this best be done?  
 
Direct versus indirect controls 
Changing the behaviour of businesses, workers and consumers is difficult. If one views participants 
as rational economic actors, then one can increase the costs of operating in the undeclared economy 
and the benefits of operating in the declared economy. As Table 2 shows, this leads to a direct 
controls approach which usually uses ‘sticks’ to punish non-compliant (‘bad’) behaviour (i.e., 
negative reinforcement), although recent years have seen the increasing use of ‘carrots’ to reward 
compliant (‘good’) behaviour (i.e., positive reinforcement).  
Less discussed until now in EU policy circles has been an indirect controls approach which views 
participants as ‘social actors’ and instead focuses upon developing the social contract between the 
state and citizens to engender a voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour and thus greater self-
regulation.  
Interviewing senior government officials involved in tackling the undeclared economy in 31 
European countries in 2010, 57 per cent stated that the use of ‘sticks’ (i.e., deterrence measures) is 
accorded the most importance in their country, 33 per cent ‘carrots’ (i.e., incentive measures) and 10 
per cent indirect controls. 
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Table 2: Policy measures for tackling the undeclared economy  
Approach  Method  Measures (examples)  
Direct controls:  
deterrents 
Improved detection  Data matching and sharing 
Joined up operations and strategy 
Increased penalties  Increased penalties for evasion  
Increase perception of risk Advertising the penalties 
Advertising the effectiveness of detection 
Direct controls: 
incentives 
For businesses  
  
Simplification of compliance 
Direct and indirect tax incentives  
Supply chain responsibility 
Support and advice to start-ups 
For individuals 
  
Supply-side incentives (e.g. society-wide amnesties; voluntary 
disclosure; smoothing transition to formalization) 
Demand-side incentives (e.g. service vouchers; targeted direct and 
indirect taxes)  
Indirect controls  Fostering culture of 
commitment  
  
Promoting benefits of declared work   
Education and awareness raising 
Tax fairness 
Procedural fairness and justice 
Redistributive justice  
Source: derived from Williams (2014: Table 5.2) 
 
These different policy measures to harness this sphere however, are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
they can be combined in at least two ways. Firstly, there is a responsive regulation approach which 
starts out by openly engaging citizens to consider their obligations and take responsibility for 
regulating themselves rather than need to be regulated by external rules. This facilitating of 
voluntary self-regulated compliance is then followed by persuasion through incentives and only as a 
last resort for the small minority refusing to be compliant does it use punitive measures (Job et al., 
2007). A second approach is the ‘slippery slope framework’ (Kirchler et al., 2008) which pursues 
both voluntary and enforced compliance concurrently, developing both greater trust in authorities 
and the greater power of authorities (Kogler et al., 2015). Until now however, which sequencing 
and/or combination is the most effective approach has not been evaluated. 
What is certain nevertheless, is that the currently dominant approach in the European Union of 
using ‘sticks’ to elicit compliant behaviour needs to change. The EU platform for tackling 
undeclared work being established at present by the European Parliament could facilitate this shift. 
Hopefully, it will do so.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             Colin C. Williams 
 @Colin_CWilliams 
Professor at Sheffield University Management School,  
University of Sheffield 
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